Abstract. We give a mathematical interpretation in terms of algebraic tori of Lucas-based cryptosystems, XTR, and the conjectural generalizations in [2] . We show that the varieties underlying these systems are quotients of algebraic tori by actions of products of symmetric groups. Further, we use these varieties to disprove conjectures from [2] .
Introduction
In a series of papers culminating in [7] , Edouard Lucas introduced and explored the properties of certain recurrent sequences that became known as Lucas functions. Since then, generalizations and applications of Lucas functions have been studied (see [17, 18, 20] ), and public key discrete log based cryptosystems (such as LUC) have been based on them (see [8, 12, 13, 19, 1] ). The Lucas functions arise when studying quadratic field extensions. Cryptographic applications of generalizations to cubic and sextic field extensions are given in [4] and [3, 6] , respectively. The cryptosystem in [6] is called XTR. An approach for constructing a generalization of these cryptosystems to the case of degree 30 extensions is suggested in [3, 2] . The idea of these cryptosystems is to represent certain elements of F × q n (for n = 2, 6, and 30, respectively) using only ϕ(n) elements of F q , and do a variant of the DiffieHellman key exchange protocol. For XTR and LUC, traces are used to represent the elements. In [2] , symmetric functions are proposed in place of the trace (which is the first symmetric function).
In [11] we use algebraic tori to construct public key cryptosystems. These systems are based on the discrete log problem in a subgroup of F × q n in which the elements can be represented by only ϕ(n) elements of F q . However, unlike LUC, XTR, and the conjectured system of [2] , our systems make direct use of the group structure of an algebraic torus, thereby allowing cryptographic applications (such as ElGamal) that depend not only on exponentiation but also on multiplication. In [11] we also give examples that disprove the open conjectures from [2] and show that the approach suggested there cannot succeed.
In this paper we give the mathematics, based on the theory of algebraic tori, underlying the cryptosystems and counterexamples in [11] , and give an algebrogeometric interpretation of the Lucas-based and XTR cryptosystems and the conjectured generalization. We show that the latter systems are not directly based on an algebraic group, but are in fact based on quotients of algebraic tori by actions of products of symmetric groups.
In §2 we define the tori T L we are interested in, and give their basic properties. In §3 we consider actions of permutation groups on tori. We define a variety X F in terms of the torus T L , and show that it is birationally equivalent to a quotient of T L by a group action. In §4 we interpret the underlying sets in LUC, XTR, and "beyond" in terms of these varieties. In §5 we study the function fields of the varieties X F in the case of degree 30 extensions, and prove that they are not generated by symmetric functions as was proposed in [2] .
Note that [10] gives another example, this time in the context of elliptic curves rather than multiplicative groups of fields, where the Weil restriction of scalars is used to obtain n log(q) bits of security from ϕ(n) log(q) bit keys.
Algebraic tori
Fix a field k, and let k s be a fixed separable closure of k. Let A d denote ddimensional affine space and let G m denote the multiplicative group. If V is a variety and D is a finite set, write
If D is a group, then D acts on V D by permuting the summands. Write
If G is a group and H is a subgroup, define a norm map
Good references for algebraic tori are [9, 14] . The character module T of a torus T is the group Hom ks (T, G m ), which has a natural (continuous) action of G k := Gal(k s /k) (and of Gal(L/k) for any field L that splits T ). Since Hom(G m , G m ) = Z, as abelian groups we have T ∼ = Z d . If T and T are tori, then there is a natural bijection between Hom k (T, T ) and Hom G k ( T , T ). In particular, the tori T and T are isomorphic over k if and only if T and T are isomorphic as G k -modules. If L is the fixed field of the kernel of the action of G k on T , then L is the minimal splitting field of T .
If M/K is a finite Galois extension and V is a variety defined over M , write Res M/K V for the Weil restriction of scalars of V from M to K. Then Res M/K V is a variety defined over K. The next proposition, which follows from the universal property of Res M/K V , summarizes the properties we need. See §1.3 of [16] or §3.12 of [14] for the definition and properties of the restriction of scalars. Proposition 2.2 Suppose M/K is a finite Galois extension and V is a variety defined over K. Let H = Gal(M/K). Then:
(i) for every field F containing K, there is a functorial bijection
(ii) there are functorial morphisms π γ : Res M/K V → V for every γ ∈ H, defined over M , such that the direct sum
compatibly with the isomorphisms of (i) and (ii), where in (i), H acts on the second factor of F ⊗ K M , (iv) if V is an algebraic group, then so is Res M/K V , and the maps above all preserve the group structure as well.
From now on suppose L is a finite Galois extension of k and k ⊆ F ⊆ L. Let
For 1 ≤ i ≤ e let σ i,F denote the composition
where the first map is the isomorphism (defined over L) of Proposition 2.2(ii) and the second map is the i-th symmetric polynomial of the e projection maps
Then G F is an algebraic torus with character module
The next result follows from Proposition 2.2.
× to the i-th symmetric polynomial evaluated on the set of G-conjugates of α, and the left map is defined by Proposition 2.2(i) with M = L, K = k, and V = A 1 .
Denote σ e,F and σ 1,F by N L/F and Tr L/F , respectively; Proposition 2.3(ii) shows that these correspond to the usual norm and trace maps on A L (k) ∼ = L. Applying Res F/k to (2.1) and using that Res F/k Res L/F A 1 = A L , we obtain maps
As above we write N L/F,k =σ e,F , and Tr L/F,k =σ 1,F .
Definition 2.4
We define T L (or T L/k when it is necessary to denote the dependence on the ground field k) to be the intersection of the kernels of the restrictions to G L of the norm maps
below constructs an explicit isomorphism between T G and G ϕ(n) m , and thus shows that T L is a torus of dimension ϕ(n) split by L. If L/k is abelian but not cyclic, then an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 2.6 shows that T L is finite, i.e., is an algebraic group of dimension zero.
Proposition 2.6 Suppose G is cyclic, and write
Proof For β ∈ G G m we have that β ∈ T G if and only if N Hi (β) = 1 for every i, and therefore
, and define
Note that γτ ∈ Γ for every τ ∈ D γ . If γ ∈ Γ, then I γ is empty, D γ = 1, and
and D γδ is independent of δ. Write D for D γδ . Then using (2.5),
γδ .
This shows that the map T G → G Γ m is surjective. We will now show injectivity. Suppose that (β γ ) γ∈G ∈ T G and β γ = 1 for every γ ∈ Γ. We will prove that β γ = 1 for every γ ∈ G, by induction on
If τ ∈ H j − {1}, then γ j τ ∈ Γ j , so |I γτ | ≤ r − 1, and by induction we have β γτ = 1. By (2.6), we have β γ = 1.
The following lemma summarizes some additional facts about T L . See §5.1 of Chapter 2 of [14] .
, where a generator of G acts on Z[ζ n ] via multiplication by a primitive n-th root of unity ζ n .
Remark 2.8 By Lemma 2.7(iii) and (iv), every algebraic torus that splits over an abelian extension of k is isogenous to some Res Fi/k T Li/Fi where each L i /k is cyclic and [L i : F i ] is square-free. Therefore once we assume that L/k is abelian, we might as well assume that L/k is cyclic and n is square-free.
An algebraic torus T of dimension d is rational if T is birationally isomorphic to A d . In [11] we show that explicit birational isomorphisms (in both directions) between T L and A ϕ(n) , where L = F q n , lead to cryptosystems with ϕ(n) log(q) bit keys whose security is based on the difficulty of the discrete log problem in F × q n . Conjecture 2.9 ( [14, 15] ) If L/k is cyclic, then the torus T L is rational.
The conjecture is true if n is a prime power (see Chapter 2 of [14] ) or a product of two prime powers ( [5] ; see also §6.3 of [14] ). In [11] we gave explicit rational parametrizations for T L when n = 2 and 6, and used them to construct public key cryptosystems. When n is divisible by more than two distinct primes the question of the rationality of T L is still open. The paper [15] claims to give a proof of the conjecture in characteristic zero, but the proof is flawed. Even the case n = 30 is open.
Group actions on tori
For this section L/k is a (finite) cyclic extension and for simplicity we assume n is square-free.
Write G = G i , with the G i cyclic groups of (distinct) prime order. 
The quotient varieties
where the right-hand vertical map is an isomorphism.
Proof That theσ i,F factor through A L /Σ H is clear. The only thing to prove is that the right-hand map is an isomorphism. Sinceσ i,F is obtained from σ i,F by applying Res F/k , it suffices to consider the case F = k, so e = n. Over L, using the identification Proof By Proposition 3.2, the maps φ j •σ i,F generate k(A L /Σ H ). Since X F is a subvariety of A L /Σ H , the restrictions of those maps to X F generate k(X F ).
If e is divisible by two distinct primes, then the action of Σ H on G L does not preserve T L . However, we have the following result
Proof Since the action of Σ G on G L is defined from the action on G G m , it suffices to show that every τ ∈ Σ Gi preserves T G . By (2.4), it suffices to show that for every (α γ ) γ∈G ∈ T G , every γ = γ 1 · · · γ t ∈ G 1 · · · G t = G, and every j, we have σ∈Gj α τ (γσ) = 1 for every γ ∈ G. Since τ ∈ Σ Gi , we have
Write H = H i with {H i } ⊆ {G i }, and define
Proof Since Σ G ∩ Σ H = Σ H , it suffices to prove the result with H = G. Suppose that σ ∈ Σ G and σ(T G ) ⊆ T G . Order the G i so that |G i | < |G i+1 |. Write π i : G → G i for the projection map, and for g ∈ G let g i = π i (g). We will first show that σ(ηG i ) = σ(η)G i for all η ∈ G and all i.
Take j minimal so that there exists an η ∈ G with σ(ηG j ) = σ(η)G j . Since Σ G acts transitively on G, there exist τ 1 , τ 2 ∈ Σ G so that τ 1 (σ(η)) = 1 and τ 2 (1) = η. Replacing σ by τ 1 στ 2 , we may assume that η = 1, σ(1) = 1, σ(G j ) = G j , and
(3.1)
For every i, fix an element δ (i) ∈ G i such that:
(Note that σ(G j )∩δ
i<j G i has at most one element, since by (
follows from the definition of δ (i) for 1 < i < j that σ(τ ) = δ (1) δ (j) and j > 1. Thus, f (σ(τ )) = 1. Since f (σ(1)) = 1, it follows that τ ∈Gj f (σ(τ )) = 1 or 2. Thus, τ ∈Gj α σ(τ ) = x or x 2 , and thus is not 1. It follows from (2.4) that σ(α) / ∈ T G , contradicting our assumption.
Thus σ(ηG i ) = σ(η)G i for all η ∈ G and all i. It follows easily that σ(g) =
where σ i is the restriction of σ to G i . This means that σ ∈ Σ G .
Proof The property of being a birational isomorphism is preserved under change of base field, so (using Proposition 2.2(ii)) it suffices to show that the map
for some large field Ω, so the x γ satisfy no multiplicative relations other than the ones that define T G , and suppose σ(x) ∈ T G (Ω) for some σ ∈ Σ H . Then σ ∈ Σ H by Proposition 3.6, and the theorem follows.
4 Understanding LUC, XTR, and "beyond" in terms of tori
In the LUC and XTR algorithms, instead of g ∈ T L one considers the trace Tr L/F (g) ∈ F . In these special cases (i.e., (n, e) = (2, 2) or (6, 3)), for g ∈ T L , the trace Tr(g) := Tr L/F (g) determines the full characteristic polynomial of g over F . Thus knowing the trace of g is equivalent to knowing its set of conjugates
In place of exponentiation (g → g j ), XTR and LUC compute Tr(g j ) from Tr(g). In the above interpretation, they compute C g j from C g , without needing to distinguish between the elements of C g . On the other hand, given sets of conjugates {g 1 , . . . , g t } and {h 1 , . . . , h t }, it is not possible (without additional information) to multiply them to produce a new set of conjugates, because we do not know if we are looking for C g1h1 or C g1h2 , for example, which will be different. In other words, Tr(g) and Tr(h) do not uniquely determine Tr(gh). Thus XTR and LUC do not have straightforward multiplication algorithms.
Suppose n is a square-free integer and e is a divisor of n. Let d = n/e, k = F q , L = F q n , and F = F q d . Then the variety X F and the torus T L defined in this paper are the variety B (d,e) and the torus T n , respectively, of [11] . We showed in Theorem 13 of [11] that the sets of traces used in LUC and XTR can be viewed naturally as subsets of X F (k) = B (d,e) (k), with (d, e) = (1, 2) and (2, 3), respectively. If the variety B (d,e) is rational, then one can represent elements of B (d,e) (k) using only ϕ(n) log q bits, and use them to do cryptography. This was done for (d, e) = (1, 2) in LUC, for (d, e) = (1, 3) in [4] , for (d, e) = (2, 3) in XTR, and for (d, e) = (2, 1) and (6, 1) in the T 2 and CEILIDH cryptosystems of [11] . The T n cryptosystems in [11] are the cases (d, e) = (n, 1). (They are conjectural when n is divisible by more than two primes, because it is not known whether such tori B (n,1) are rational.) Theorem 3.7 implies that B (d,e) is birationally isomorphic to T n / primes | e S , where the symmetric group on letters, S , is identified with Σ Gal(L/M ) where M = F q n/ . In particular,
The variety B (d,e) is not generally a group. However, when e = 1, then B (d,e) is the torus T n , which is a group. This is why the torus-based cryptosystems of [11] can take advantage of both multiplication and exponentiation, while LUC and XTR are exponentiation-based.
Conjectured cryptosystems for other (d, e) are discussed in [2] . The questions in [2] can be interpreted in the language of the present paper as questions about the morphism from B (d,e) to A ϕ(n) induced by the first ϕ(n)/d symmetric functions on the Gal(L/F )-conjugates. The examples in [11] show that when (d, e) = (1, 30) or (2, 15) , then these symmetric functions do not generate the coordinate ring of B (d,e) . Theorem 5.3 below shows that these functions do not even generate the function field, so the corresponding morphisms are not birational isomorphisms, and do not give short representations of elements of B (d,e) .
"Beyond" XTR
In §2 of [11] we answered the open questions from [2] by giving numerical counterexamples. Here we give an algebro-geometric context for these examples, and prove stronger results than those proved in [11] . In [2] it is asked whether, for elements of the order Φ n (p) subgroup of F × p n that do not lie in any proper subfield, it is possible to recover the entire minimal polynomial over a subfield F p d from the first ϕ(n)/d symmetric polynomials. Retaining the notation of §3 above, then Conjectures 1 and 3 of [2] would imply, respectively, the following two statements.
+ then there is a d ∈ Z + dividing both n and ϕ(n) such that Statement 5.1 holds with that n and d, for every prime p.
As shown in §5 of [3] 
Proof Suppose that F = k. The proof when F/k is quadratic is exactly analogous. Note that k(X k ) is generated byσ 1,k , . . . ,σ 8,k if and only if the morphism ⊕
8 is a birational isomorphism, and for an extension field Ω of L this holds if and only if this is a birational isomorphism over Ω.
Given G, a cyclic group of order 30, Proposition 2.6 gives an isomorphism . By a computer search we found points x, y ∈ T G (F 7 30 ), distinct modulo the action of Σ G , such that s(x) = s(y). See §2 of [11] for the details of this computation; we take x and y to be the first two entries in Table 1 (respectively, Table 3 in the case [F : k] = 2). We computed further that J(x) = 0 and J(y) = 0. Set a = s(x) = s(y) ∈ (F 7 30 ) 8 , and letL be the unramified extension of Q 7 of degree 30. By Hensel's Lemma, for every liftã of a toL 8 we can find unique lifts x of x andỹ of y to T G (L) such that s(x) = s(ỹ) =ã. Thus there is an open (in the 7-adic topology) subset U ⊆L 8 contained in the image of s, over which s is not one-to-one. It follows that as an algebraic map overL, s is dominant and deg(s) > 1. Therefore s is not a birational isomorphism overL. The theorem now follows for all k of characteristic zero. Let P be the (finite) set of prime numbers that divide f in A. Suppose p / ∈ P . Then pA (resp., pB ) is a prime ideal of A (resp., B ), and the localizations A (p) and B (p) are not equal. By Nakayama's Lemma, F p (x 1 , . . . , x 8 ) = Frac(A /pA ) = A (p) /pA (p) = B (p) /pB (p) = Frac(B /pB ) = F p (X G ). Thus s 1 , . . . , s 8 do not generate F p (X G ), and the same holds with F p replaced by any field of characteristic p.
Remark 5.4
In fact, our computer computations give additional examples which show that no ten (respectively, four) of the symmetric functions generate the coordinate ring of X F over F 7 (for [F : k] = 1 or 2, respectively).
